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A historic turning point. 
Political change and the 
socio-institutional 
situation in Latin America
Fernando Calderón
“Irremediably and in the sight of all, the traditional ‘consistency’ of Latin America is 
now being lost. (…) This raises two essential and unavoidable questions. First, what 
are the foundations of the new structure which is superseding the old one and was 
contained within it from the earliest stages of its decomposition? Second, where is the 
ultimate basis for the prise de conscience that, with the advent of the new economic 
cycle, is disclosing the physiognomy of the immediate future?”
José Medina Echeverría
Sociología latinoamericana
Latin America is going through a time of political crisis, reconfiguration 
and change in which the relationship between institutions and equity will 
be crucial to future democratic governance. In particular, this crisis and 
this reconfiguration are first and foremost sociocultural in nature. Politics 
and political actors would be in no position to resolve politico-institutional 
problems if they were not capable of confronting society’s problems, 
particularly those of equity and poverty. This article synthesizes and 
reviews a number of socio-historical trends, formulates some observations 
aimed at illustrating and disaggregating its main findings, considers the 
medium-term outlook and suggests a road map for improving democratic 
governance in Latin America.
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The purpose of this paper is to synthesize certain 
socio-historical trends in Latin America that are 
critical to the outlook for democratic governance, 
and to see what lessons can be drawn from them.
Following a period of major structural reforms 
and democratic transition, Latin America is beginning 
a new cycle in its history. This is particularly apparent 
in the member countries of the Regional Project for 
Political Analysis and Short- and Medium-Term 
Scenarios (papep), which are considered here.1 
This recent experience has created a climate of 
disappointment and dissatisfaction, but has also 
generated great expectations of change and progress 
under democracy, which society still perceives as the 
most acceptable form of government. Dissatisfaction 
is conjoined with the emergence of  more critical 
and independent citizens associated with new public 
spaces of participation, conflict and dialogue.
The organizing idea behind this study is 
that Latin America is going through a period of 
political crisis, reconfiguration and change in which 
the relationship between institutions and equity 
will be crucial to future democratic governance. 
The progress made on these two fronts, with their 
  This paper was prepared with the assistance of Juan Enrique 
Vega and Caterina Colombo. The author is particularly grateful 
for the comments and suggestions made on the draft by Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, Manuel Castells, Juan Gabriel Valdés and 
his colleagues at the Regional Bureau for Latin America and 
the Caribbean of the United Nations Development Programme 
(undp). Earlier versions were presented at internal papep-undp 
seminars. The author is also grateful for the assistance of Diego 
Achard, Antonio Araníbar, Luis Eduardo González, Armando 
Ortuño, Gerardo Noto, Eugenia Bóveda and Emilio Sampietro. 
I
Introduction
specific international and local economic contexts, 
will largely determine the prospects of the current 
reconfiguration offering a route towards renewed 
democratization and development.
I t  i s  a l so  argued that  th is  cr i s i s  and 
reconfiguration are primarily sociocultural in nature: 
politics and political actors will be in no position 
to resolve politico-institutional problems if  they 
are not capable of confronting society’s problems, 
particularly those of equity and poverty.
A fundamental question is how to go about 
constructing politico-institutional options for 
resolving these problems. Or, to put it another way, 
how politics and democratic institutions will process 
the changes being experienced by Latin American 
societies in a context of rapid globalization.
This article examines socio-historical trends 
and offers some observations that are intended 
to illustrate and disaggregate its main findings. It 
also discusses medium-term prospects in the form 
of  basic scenarios and formulates a proposal for 
improved governance in Latin America that includes 
a basic road map of  the aspects to which most 
attention needs to be paid.
This paper has drawn on national studies dealing with economic 
trends and short-term scenarios in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay, on studies 
by the papep Regional Observatory and on a wide range of 
bibliographical material and secondary data on the subject.
1 papep is part of  the undp regional strategy on democratic 
governance in Latin America, and is intended to strengthen that 
governance. The main activities of the Project include preparing 
reports on current economic conditions and short- and medium-term 
scenarios (see http://www.papep.org for further information).
II
Socio-historical problems and challenges
Of all the various problems and challenges facing 
the different Latin American countries, it has been 
possible to identify some that affect democratic 
governance and that constitute frames of reference 
for short- and medium-term political scenarios. The 
main ones will now be examined.
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1. Crisis situations and politico-institutional 
risks
The crisis situations and politico-institutional risks 
that many Latin American countries have been 
experiencing are affecting the development of 
democracy, altering the region’s political profile and 
indicating a need for new types of linkage between 
institutions and society at large.
So far this century, over 30% of Latin American 
democracies have experienced acute politico-
institutional crises affecting their key institutions 
(presidency and legislature).2 Taken together, these 
situations of acute crisis and of risk or near-crisis 
make it plain that consolidating the Latin American 
democracies is a difficult process whose success 
is not assured. Furthermore, a number of  Latin 
America’s best-consolidated democratic regimes are 
passing through periods of  “soft” socio-political 
reconfiguration.3
Unrealized expectations among the population 
at large are an empirical factor that is crucial to 
the relationship between institutions and society, 
since they can trigger episodes of ungovernability if  
combined with fragile public institutions and poor 
economic conditions.4 These situations reveal the 
weaknesses of Latin American democracies and the 
risks they face and will probably carry on facing. 
To contribute to the consolidation of  democracy 
in Latin America, it is therefore necessary to reach 
a better understanding of  the nature of  political 
change and the prospects it opens up, before going 
on to look for solutions that can help bring about 
democratic development.
2. The limits of representation and 
intermediation systems
Politico-institutional problems are associated with the 
limits of representation systems and a widespread 
mistrust of  institutions, particularly political 
parties and intermediation mechanisms generally 
(figure 1). The emergence of  thoughtful, critical 
and independent citizens and demands for local 
participation, recognition of indigenous movements 
and gender equity are factors that can reconfigure 
systems of representation.
Institutional problems stem from the limited 
ability of party political action to represent society 
institutionally. This translates into crises of political 
representation and intermediation. The slogan “Out 
with the lot of  them!” heard in Argentina, the 
October 2003 crisis in Bolivia and the demands of 
the so-called “Outlaws’ Rebellion” (Rebelión de los 
Forajidos) in Ecuador are examples of widespread 
disenchantment with politics and political parties in 
the region. According to the Latinobarómetro Report 
2006,5 58% of Latin Americans believe that there 
can be no democracy without political parties, but 
just 22% trust them.
In some countries the crisis of representation 
is being made more complex by the manifestations 
of  multiculturalism, especially among indigenous 
peoples, given the traditional inability of institutional 
systems to represent them. These peoples are 
demanding participation and change throughout 
much of Latin America, and political systems are 
being substantially modified as a result, especially 
in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru.
Continuing institutional constraints on women’s 
participation are another feature of  many Latin 
American countries. Gender inequality is the 
outcome of a set of  mutually reinforcing cultural 
5 The Latinobarómetro Report appears in the bibliography of this 
article under the name of the organization that publishes it, the 
Corporación Latinobarómetro.
2 Since the beginning of  the twenty-first century, at least six 
countries have experienced crises of this nature: Paraguay (2000), 
Peru (2000), Argentina (2001), Venezuela (2003), Bolivia (2003 
and 2005) and Ecuador (2000 and 2005). Of these eight situations, 
six ended in the downfall of the president of the day (Fujimori in 
Peru, De la Rúa in Argentina, Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa in 
Bolivia and Mahuad and Gutiérrez in Ecuador), either because 
the legislature removed them from office or because they resigned. 
One crisis involved the military and culminated in the removal 
from office of  Cubas Grau as President of  Paraguay and the 
murder of a vice-president, and the last was an unsuccessful coup 
d’état against ]President Chávez of Venezuela. There were other 
political crises that came close to, but stopped short of, the kind 
of extreme situations described. They include those of Nicaragua 
(late 2004 and early 2005) and Honduras (early 2006).
3 Uruguay is an example. As Moreira (2006) puts it, Uruguay 
is not in crisis; however, “the arrival of the left in government 
marks a turning point which, in much the same way as crises, 
provides an excellent window of opportunity to initiate a public 
debate encompassing our different positions and attitudes towards 
the country”.
4 An analysis by González (2006) empirically demonstrates the 
relationship between institutional shortcomings (judicial-legal 
effectiveness index) and unrealized expectations (per capita 
gdp growth in 1975-2003), revealing a moderate but significant 
association between these two variables. The seven countries that 
experienced acute political crises display negative outcomes for 
the two variables, while the three “consolidated” countries (Chile, 
Costa Rica and Uruguay) are at the opposite extreme.
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and political inequalities. These affect women’s 
access to property rights, wealth and education, 
restricting their ability to participate in labour 
markets and power structures generally. Despite the 
progress made by women in terms of public policy 
and political participation,6 politico-institutional 
actors still find it difficult to process changes and 
demands on a basis of  gender equity. This has 
adverse effects on the quality of  democracy and 
democratic governance.
Lastly, divides between subnational regions 
(territories) in Latin America appear to be widening. 
New conflicts and strains are arising between the 
global, local and national levels. Subnational regions 
are now seeking their own forms of  democratic 
legitimacy, autonomy within their countries and 
a direct link with globalization; these demands 
and aspirations translate into economic tensions, 
with political and electoral consequences, and 
sometimes into major politico-institutional crises. 
These are clearly on display in Bolivia (between the 
altiplano and the lowlands), whose elites believe that 
subnational regional factors are among the main 
components of the crisis. But there are many other 
countries where subnational divides (coast-uplands 
or north-south) are expressed politically. Another 
source of  strain here is the emergence of  a new 
institutional order.
3. Demands for greater State involvement and 
more citizen oversight
In different ways and to varying degrees, there have 
been new demands in the political sphere, first, 
for greater State involvement in the management 
of  development and the expansion of  democratic 
institutions and, second, for greater citizen oversight 
over the public authorities.
Large sections of  the population are calling 
for a new relationship between the State and 
6 Empirical data show that the political involvement of women 
has increased in the countries studied, although it remains low. 
While Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Panama and Peru have established quotas laying down a 
minimum level of female participation (between 20% and 40%) 
in party lists for elections to the legislature, only in Argentina 
does female participation in parliament exceed 30%. In the 
other countries the percentage ranges from 23% (Mexico) to 6% 
(Honduras) (eclac, 2006a).
FIGURE 1
Latin America: trust in State institutions, 1996, 2000 and 2004
(Percentages)
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the economy whereby the State works for social 
integration and equity at the same time as bolstering 
the economy in a context of globalization. According 
to the Latinobarómetro Report 2005, an average 
of  only 31% of  the Latin Americans interviewed 
believed that privatization was advantageous. The 
Latinobarómetro Report 2006 asked where the 
responsibility for wealth creation lay, using a scale 
of  1 to 10 where “1 = the State has to produce 
wealth” and “10 = private enterprises have to 
produce wealth”; a medium-high level of  support 
for State control among Latin Americans emerged, 
as the average score for the region was 4.1. In 
Argentina, interviews with members of  elites and 
public opinion surveys revealed a shared desire to 
reshape relations between businesses and the State: 
28.5% of those surveyed said that the State should 
intervene to ensure that the benefits of  economic 
growth were fairly distributed, while 45.6% expressed 
a wish to see providers of public services return to 
State ownership and 44.7% said they should remain 
in private hands but with greater State oversight 
(undp Argentina, 2005). Similarly, over 70% of 
Bolivians expressed a desire for the State to become 
more involved in the gas business (undp Bolivia, 
2004). In general, all the national studies carried out 
revealed a desire for greater State ownership in the 
interests of democratic governance.
It is also likely that this demand for greater 
State involvement is related, first, to the need for 
greater human security, an issue that increasingly 
affects the day-to-day lives of citizens,7 and second, 
to a rise in anomic behaviour by excluded social 
groups, especially youths, reflecting the limits of 
social cohesion and a degree of social breakdown.
At the same time, there are demands for 
coordination between citizens and the State with 
a view to introducing mechanisms for greater 
citizen participation, as well as demands for the 
consolidation of  State institutions in the interests 
of  public service and State unity. The issue of 
accountability, which concerns public policy 
transparency, information and citizen oversight 
mechanisms, comes up in round after round. 
The demands for a transparent, independent and 
institutionalized judiciary reveal that this is a real 
touchstone for the population, something that is 
clearly reflected in the Corruption Perceptions Index 
produced by Transparency International (table 1).
4. The problems of inequality and poverty
These problems are at the heart of socio-economic 
trends and may be the factors that most influence 
both democratic governance and the development of 
new political options in the countries studied.
The structural reform policies applied by the 
countries of  Latin America resulted in a whole 
array of  socio-economic changes that altered the 
configuration of  the different national societies. 
One of  their most significant effects was to make 
social differentiation processes increasingly complex, 
something that has affected the quality of  social 
reproduction in its different forms.
Even as social differentiation processes have 
resulted in growing disparities between developing and 
industrialized countries (Latin America remains one 
of the world’s most unequal regions, and inequalities 
and differences between nations are actually on the 
increase), developing countries are characterized by 
persistent and in some cases widening internal divides 
in most aspects of life. In many of them, the income 
share of the wealthiest 20% of the population has 
increased, while that of  the poorest 20% has held 
7 According to World Health Organization (who) data, the murder 
rate was 16.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991, but 27.5 in 2000. 
Information available at http://www.who.int/violence_injury_
prevention/violence/world_report/en/annex.pdf.
TABLE 1 
Latin America (13 countries):
















Source: prepared by the author using data from Transparency 
International.
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steady or declined (table 2).8 Various social indicators 
also reveal profound disparities between the sexes, 
subnational regions, socio-economic classes and 
ethnic groups.
Where gender disparities are concerned, there 
are still large pay gaps between men and women with 
the same number of years of completed education 
(table 3). On average, women earn approximately 80% 
as much as men. The adverse effects of  this wage 
inequality may have been intensified by the increase 
in the number of women household heads.
Social differentiation is also revealed by the 
large disparities between countries in the proportion 
of people living in indigence, which has substantial 
implications for governance. At one extreme (Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), indigence 
affects over 30% of the total population, whereas at 
the other (Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay) indigence 
levels are below 10% (eclac, 2007).
Poverty in the Latin American countries is 
not homogeneous but is socially and culturally 
differentiated, as can be seen from the variations 
in poverty levels by geographical area, gender and 
ethnic origin. In 2005, 39.8% of Latin Americans 
were below the poverty line, but if  rural areas 
only were taken the proportion increased to 58.8% 
(figure 2).
Furthermore, as Buvinic and Roza (2004) argue, 
gender and ethnic origin interact to produce an even 
greater degree of social exclusion. In consequence, 
the education levels of indigenous women are much 
lower than those of non-indigenous women. Over 
50% of indigenous girls in Bolivia and Guatemala 
have left school by 14 (Arias and Duryea, 2003). In 
Bolivia, Peru and Guatemala, indigenous women 
are more likely to be working for low pay and in 
the informal sector (Duryea and Genoni, 2004). 
This adverse interaction is compounded by another 
factor, geographical location, since indigenous 
peoples tend to live in rural areas with higher levels 
of poverty than urban areas.
8 Between 1990 and 2005, the Gini coefficient fell in Brazil, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay, held 
steady in Chile, Nicaragua and Panama and increased in 
Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. Furthermore, in 2005 only 
Uruguay qualified as a country with a low level of  inequality, 
while many of the region’s countries display inequality levels that 
are high or, in the case of Argentina, Brazil and Honduras, very 
high (eclac, 2007).
TABLE 2
Latin America (13 countries):a personal 
income concentration, 1990 and 200
(Percentages)
Country Poorest 20% Wealthiest 20%
 of  the population  of  the population
 1990 2005 Change 1990 2005 Change
Argentinab 4.1 3.5 -0.6 54.9 57.2 2.3
Bolivia 1.3 1.5 0.2 61.2 64.4 3.2
Brazil 2.1 2.4 0.3 66.8 65.5 -1.3
Chile 3.5 3.7 0.2 60.6 60.4 -0.2
Colombia 3.7 2.9 -0.8 57.8 63.0 5.2
Ecuadorb 4.8 3.8 -1.0 51.9 56.3 4.4
Guatemalac 2.7 3.7 1.0 62.7 59.3 -3.4
Honduras 2.4 2.4 0.0 65.7 62.4 -3.3
Mexico 3.9 3.7 -0.2 58.7 57.6 -1.1
Nicaragua 2.1 2.5 0.4 61.3 61.7 0.4
Panama 2.8 2.5 -0.3 60.0 58.2 -1.8
Perud 3.0 3.8 0.8 57.9 55.2 -2.7
Uruguayb 5.1 4.8 -0.3 51.9 50.7 -1.2
Source: prepared by the author using data from eclac (2007).
a Selection criterion: the member countries of  papep were 
included (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru and Uruguay) along with others deemed relevant 
for reference and comparison purposes.
b Urban areas.
c 1990 and 2002 data.
d 1997 and 2003 data.
TABLE 3
Latin America (13 countries):a ratio between 
men’s and women’s wages, by years of 
study completed, around 2004
(Percentages)
Country Year Total 13 years of
   education and over
Argentina 2004 86.6 76.6
Bolivia 2002 74.4 64.2
Brazil 2003 76.7 61.9
Chile 2003 81.7 69.0
Colombia 2002 89.2 80.0
Ecuador 2002 83.7 72.9
Guatemala 2002 82.4 87.0
Honduras 2002 82.8 68.7
Mexico 2004 82.1 69.6
Nicaragua 2001 83.0 71.9
Panama 2002 82.7 71.4
Peru 2003 77.4 70.8
Uruguay 2002 80.8 66.8
Source: prepared by the author using data from eclac (2006a).
a Selection criterion: the member countries of  papep were 
included (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru and Uruguay) along with others deemed 
relevant for reference and comparison purposes.
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To be effective, governance and public policies 
aimed at combating poverty need to take the 
heterogeneity and complexity of  inequality and 
poverty itself  into account. Other factors in the 
relationship between governance and social inequality 
are people’s subjective perceptions, the willingness 
of  society to change the situation, the frustration 
of a more educated population’s expectations, the 
limitations in the behaviour of  elites that do not 
guide their societies but only dominate them and, 
most especially, the dynamic of old and new socio-
cultural conflicts. Confronting the issue of poverty 
and inequity means first and foremost empowering 
societies and States to generate policies that enhance 
the civic capabilities of  the poorest and most 
excluded. Meanwhile, the poor and/or excluded 
themselves should be seeking to turn their needs into 
demands that are expressed in the political system 
and generate results. What seems to be at stake in the 
management of democratic governance, then, is the 
ability to manage changes already in progress.
. Thwarted expectations
A crucial factor in the relationship between politico-
institutional change and social change is the growing 
frustration of  people’s expectations, the result of 
the severe problems of  inequality and poverty 
already described interacting with higher levels of 
education and greater access to traditional and 
new communications media (table 4). The result is 
societies that are better educated and more exposed 
to cultural consumption but lack the resources to 
meet the demands this exposure gives rise to. This 
leads to thwarted expectations and is probably one 
of the main sources of the conflict and dissatisfaction 
that complicate the task of democratic governance.
In this context, citizens are no longer satisfied 
with political programmes (which are perceived as 
unfulfilled) or with the options made available by 
a promising market economy. They are tending to 
be more realistic, critical and informed and to have 
a clearer notion of  their own independence and 
freedom of action.
6. Poor leadership by governing elites
One factor that contributes to institutional crises is 
poor national leadership by governing elites.
It would appear that alterations and structural 
limitations in social and political leadership, 
particularly among groups at the top of the power 
FIGURE 2 
Latin America (11 countries):a proportion of people living in poverty
in rural and urban areas, 200
(Percentages)
Source: prepared by the author using data from eclac (2007).
a Selection criterion: the member countries of  papep were included (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru and Uruguay) along with others deemed relevant for reference and comparison purposes.
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structure, are contributors to the low institutional 
profile of  most Latin American countries. There 
must be a question mark, then, over the ability 
of  elites to develop the kind of  national vision 
and practice needed to resolve socio-institutional 
problems as part of  a comprehensive governance 
approach.
Again, the perceptions of elites are a particularly 
important factor when exploring the evolution of 
democratic governance. The interviews conducted 
by papep with 206 business, political and social 
leaders reveal a broad consensus in these groups 
that the problems of poverty and institutions are the 
main challenges facing democracy in Latin America. 
The information obtained by the papep Regional 
Observatory indicates that: (i) about 50% of  the 
elites in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico consider 
that poverty and inequity are the recurrent causes 
of  the problems of  democracy in the region; (ii) 
most European elites believe that the region’s main 
problem is its bad income distribution and structural 
poverty; and (iii) elites in the United States have 
divided views, with 47% believing that institutional 
failings are Latin America’s main challenge and 
44% casting poverty and inequality in this role 
(Observatorio Regional papep, 2006-2007).
Public opinion is at one with the elites in 
considering that poverty and inequality affect 
the functioning of  democracy in Latin America. 
According to the Latinobarómetro Report 2005, 
on a scale of  1 (poorest) to 10 (richest), the 
average score Latin Americans give themselves is 
3.66. The Latinobarómetro Report 2006 finds that 
more than 66% of  Latin Americans believe their 
countries to be governed by a few powerful groups 
who act in their own interest. Indeed, in Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama less than 20% 
of inhabitants believe that their country is governed 
for the benefit of  the whole population. Elites in 
Argentina, meanwhile, are only partially attuned 
to citizens’ perceptions since, unlike these, they are 
somewhat reluctant to prioritize the fight against 
poverty in the light of  events in recent years.9 In 
Honduras, the disrepute into which elites have fallen 
particularly affects judges, whom 51% of Hondurans 
consider untrustworthy, and deputies in the National 
9 Only 17% of  business leaders consider poverty to be the 
country’s main problem, while 30.2% of the Argentineans surveyed 
mentioned unemployment and poverty as the two aspects the 
country most needed to improve (undp Argentina, 2005).
TABLE 4
Latin America (13 countries):a indicators of technology use, 1990 and 2002
(Per 100 inhabitants)
Country Telephone lines and mobile phones Personal computers Internet users
 1990 2004 Change 1998 2004 Change 1996 2004 Change
Argentina 9.3 58.1 48.8 5.5 8.2 2.7 0.2 16.1 15.9
Bolivia 2.8 27.0 24.2 0.8 2.3 1.5 0.2 3.9 3.7
Brazil 6.5 59.8 53.3 3.0 1.7 7.7 0.5 12.2 11.7
Chile 6.7 83.6 76.9 6.3 13.9 7.6 0.7 27.9 27.2
Colombia 6.5 40.1 33.6 3.0 5.5 2.5 0.5 8.9 8.4
Ecuador 4.8 39.1 34.3 1.9 5.5 3.6 0.1 4.7 4.6
Guatemala 2.1 34.0 31.9 0.8 1.8 1.0 0.0 6.0 6.0
Honduras 1.7 15.7 14.0 0.8 1.6 0.8 0.0 3.2 3.2
Mexico 6.6 53.9 47.3 3.7 10.7 7.0 0.2 13.4 13.2
Nicaragua 1.3 16.8 15.5 1.9 3.5 1.6 0.1 2.2 2.1
Panama 9.3 38.8 29.5 2.7 4.1 1.4 0.2 9.5 9.3
Peru 2.6 22.1 19.5 3.0 9.7 6.7 0.3 11.6 11.3
Uruguay 13.4 49.4 36.0 9.1 13.3 4.2 1.9 21.0 19.1
Latin America 6.4 50.1 43.7 3.4 9.1 5.8 0.3 11.9 11.6
Source: prepared by the author using data from eclac (2007).
a Selection criterion: the member countries of  papep were included (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru and Uruguay) along with others deemed relevant for reference and comparison purposes.
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Congress, mistrusted by 71% of  the population 
(undp Honduras, 2005).
In Latin America, cultural tendencies that have 
traditionally characterized elites (lack of austerity 
and solidarity and a lack of  proportion between 
ends and means) seem to persist, and would account 
for the unequal distribution of power and for these 
public perceptions. However, the behaviour patterns 
of elites have also been changing, or new elites with 
different cultural tendencies have emerged. Better 
knowledge of changes in the composition, forms of 
socialization and tendencies of  elites would make 
it possible to improve the accuracy of  political 
mapping, which is a key to diagnosing democratic 
governance trends in the region.
7. The growth and fragmentation of social 
conflict
Broadly speaking, social conflicts in Latin American 
societies have increased and intensified, but they have 
also fragmented. In some cases these are conflicts of 
reaction and protest, while in others what is at work 
are new sociocultural forces that are configuring 
new political options. These conflicts reveal how 
difficult it is for institutions and the State to achieve 
integration, recognition and social progress. What 
seem to be emerging are new political maps oriented 
not by a single reference point but by several more 
limited yet powerful ones. These societies might be 
said, then, to be polycentric.
Citizens have sought other channels to express 
their demands and their dissatisfaction with politics, 
including alternative organizations with the capacity 
to defy and thereby weaken the State, and organized 
street protests. A number of these protest movements 
have come together in alternative political projects, 
such as the Movement to Socialism (mas) in Bolivia, 
or in support of progressive forces in several of the 
continent’s countries. Anomic behaviour can also be 
seen, especially among young people, aimed against 
an order that they do not recognize and that has no 
place for them.
To sum up, institutional problems and those of 
inequity and poverty are mutually reinforcing, as well 
as being affected by the existing social situation. This 
seems to represent a severe constraint on democracy 
in Latin America and to suggest some very intractable 
scenarios. This is why it is so vitally important to link 
social reform with politico-institutional reform to 
improve democratic governance.
8. Spaces of communication
Spaces of communication, whether the traditional 
ones or the new electronic networks, are an ever more 
important factor when it comes to understanding the 
scope and agendas of political power and change. 
Political and sociocultural actors participate and 
take decisions in these spaces and governance cannot 
be understood without them.
One development of particular importance is 
the mediatization of politics by television and, more 
recently, by horizontal methods of communication 
such as the Internet, mobile telephony and others. 
The arena of expression or representation of politics 
is increasingly media-dominated and the main 
characteristic of the media is that they are the space 
in which power is expressed. In the region, according 
to data from the Latinobarómetro Report 2006, 
television and radio are among the most trusted 
institutions: 69% and 64% of  those consulted, 
respectively, claim to trust them; furthermore, 
television is the most heavily used information 
medium, with 83% of Latin Americans getting their 
news from television in 2006.
In fact, 65% of  231 Latin American leaders 
interviewed in consultation rounds named the media 
as being among the most powerful institutions in 
the region (undp, 2004). In Bolivia, the media, and 
especially television, are having a growing impact 
on the way politics is conducted (undp Bolivia, 
2004). During the Outlaws’ Rebellion in Ecuador 
(April 2005), tens of  thousands of  families were 
called out on to the streets of Quito by e-mail and 
mobile phone, leading to the resignation of President 
Lucio Gutiérrez. Generally speaking, it is the media 
arena that determines the dynamic of  political 
representation systems and creates the conditions for 
institutional legitimacy in the region; it also points 
to the emergence of an audience democracy, an issue 
that requires further investigation and analysis.
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Developments in the world economy between 2005 
and 2007 were favourable, particularly for Latin 
America, which enjoyed a positive growth rate 
(about 5% in 2006) with a modest slowdown in 
2007 (eclac, 2006b), owing to a fall-off  in the 
pace of  world economic activity, higher oil prices 
and the incipient subprime crisis, which was to 
unleash the global recession that has spread across 
the world this year. The moderation of  growth 
was accompanied by regional convergence around 
the average growth rate of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Two categories of  countries can be 
established: (i) those with exceptionally high growth 
rates in 2004 (Argentina and Uruguay), which were 
to grow at a rate closer to the average, and (ii) those 
with below-average growth rates that year (Bolivia), 
where growth would pick up.
The region’s economic activity was largely 
driven by external demand. Latin America’s terms 
of  trade improved, and this was particularly true 
of countries exporting oil, gas or metal ores (such 
as Bolivia, Chile, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela). In an optimistic scenario, the prices 
of  coffee and sugar are expected to remain at 
their present high levels, as are remittances sent by 
migrants to their home countries.
The economic growth outlook is relatively 
favourable or less negative for the region over the 
medium term. However, whatever growth is attained 
will not generate greater social equity on its own, 
nor will it automatically feed through in a desirable 
way to policy and institutions. The question must 
be, then, how this growth will affect the socio-
institutional dynamic, how the orientation of 
economic growth will stimulate dynamics of social 
equity, and what role the national State will play.
The different political forces are offering 
different approaches to integrating social demands 
and popular pressure. In this context, it is possible 
to envisage four general policy approaches and three 
types of governance scenario.
1. General policy approaches
To group these approaches, the following typology 
has been prepared on the basis of  the political 
characteristics predominating in the region.10
(i) Conservative modernization: modernization of the 
party system, restoration and reinforcement of 
authority, institutional reform to connect actors 
and systems, relegitimization of authority on the 
basis of incontrovertible shared values, moral 
order associated with market expansion and 
ideological association with the United States.
(ii) Practical reformism: renewal and refashioning of 
the party system, secularism, alliance-building, 
quest by the State for a form of institutional 
management combining economic growth 
with inclusiveness, modern party system and 
pragmatic relationship with the United States.
(iii) Popular nationalism: quest for political hegemony, 
central role for the State in the organization of 
development and democracy, mass mobilization, 
charismatic leadership legitimized by democracy, 
primacy of  redistribution over production, 
 anti-imperialism.
(iv) Neo-developmentalist indigenism: expanded 
political participation and deliberative democracy, 
strong social and indigenous movements, State 
that negotiates with transnational enterprises 
and pursues inclusiveness, and egalitarianism 
and moderate anti-imperialism.
Given these approaches, we need to consider 
how the following issues are addressed. How are the 
demands of  society dealt with and how is wealth 
distributed? What is the right way to operate in 
conditions of increasing social activism, especially 
in countries with substantial natural resources? 
How can democratic political control be exercised 
10 This typology is qualitative and is based on speeches by 
political leaders, party manifestos and election results.
III
Basic governance scenarios
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over the whole State apparatus? In short, how can 
growth be combined with institutional change and 
the distribution of power?
2. Scenarios
In an ideal scenario, a virtuous interaction would 
be achieved between social reform and institutional 
change, with strong conflict prediction and management 
capabilities; the result would be progressive governance 
and sustainable economic dynamism. In a second 
scenario, a continuation of  the status quo, there 
would be a continuing divide between the social and 
institutional spheres; only the political and social 
reforms indispensable for a minimum of economic 
governance would be implemented, and conflict 
anticipation and management capabilities would 
be variable. In a third scenario, outbreaks of social 
unrest, the fragmentation of conflicts and institutional 
breakdown could conceivably lead to situations of 
social chaos, economic crisis and a retreat from 
democracy; conflict anticipation and management 
capabilities would be very poor.
In reality, the likelihood of  the different 
scenarios depends on the political capacity of 
national actors to combine domestic change with 
participation in global change. They may find 
themselves in something resembling one of  the 
three scenarios described, with institutional factors, 
equity-poverty and the innovation capacity of actors 
in the political system combining in different ways. 
They may attach different levels of importance to 
each component and will differ in their political 
development. Some will give priority to institutional 
advances and will seek to reduce poverty, while 
others will try to improve equity without attempting 
much on the institutional front. Others still may 
look for particular one-off  combinations. Thus, 
combinations will vary depending on the political 
actions and approaches that prevail in the region.
Scenarios are subject to constant change and 
risk. The way risks are turned into opportunities 
and uncertainty (inherent in modern change) is 
coped with will undoubtedly help to determine 
which political paths the society concerned may be 
in a position to follow. The existing institutional 
basis and the progress made with equity and 
poverty reduction are other important factors 
underlying political developments. Likewise, the 
strength and quality of  citizen participation will 
have a critical influence on the quality of  change. 
The more citizens are empowered to make choices 
or create alternatives by accepting risk, the better 
the prospects of a virtuous evolution. In short, the 
quality of the political structure that is created will 
be a decisive factor.
The medium-term scenarios set out in a variety 
of national studies prefigure the trends likely to be 
displayed by the countries of  the region that are 
part of papep.11
11 See www.papep.org for further information.
IV
A road map for a democratic
governance agenda
The historic turning point Latin America has now 
reached offers new potential to combine economic 
opportunity with measures that can strengthen 
the ability of  political and sociocultural actors to 
initiate a new cycle of democracy and development 
on the basis of more and better social equity. The 
political options are varied and the challenge ahead 
is to understand the changes now taking place and 
act upon them in the light of the new tendencies in 
society, the economy and politics. A new form of 
citizenship is arising in all the countries and there are 
new types of linkage between society and the State. 
It seems likely that there will be a redistribution of 
power in society.
Any agenda for action on democratic governance 
ought to include the aspects described below.
(i) Restore and enhance political ethics based on 
equity and respect for institutions. There is a need 
to promote a political culture that values the public 
good, in association however with rigorous policies 
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for oversight of  public activities. Accordingly, it 
is important to strengthen citizen oversight and 
the development of  independent institutions with 
specific powers of  judicial investigation, and even 
to allow audits by international organizations such 
as Transparency International.
(ii) Link policy renewal to changes in society 
(new social structure, new intercultural reproduction 
mechanisms, new patterns of socialization, development 
of the network society, strategic importance of migration, 
etc.) and also to the new problems and challenges of 
globalization. This means rebuilding society’s political 
management capabilities, strengthening political 
and sociocultural actors, enhancing the capacity for 
autonomous and independent analysis (in universities, 
academic centres and other institutions) with a view 
to preparing short- and medium-term proposals, 
encouraging deliberation processes, creating shared 
options, establishing new grammars of conflict (i.e., 
new languages with different and more complex rules) 
and orienting renewal towards results that legitimize 
political action itself. In short, there is a need for 
agendas that focus on managing policy renewal. No 
political party on its own has the resources to guide 
development. The new social complexity requires 
polycentric coordination, a network of negotiations 
and agreements, and progress beyond a purely 
electoral form of democracy, while recognizing the 
intrinsic value of this. The renewal of political parties 
cannot come solely from within the party system 
but has to be based on a new relationship between 
State and society.
(iii) Propose new forms of representation and 
participation to restore confidence in the party system
and the institutions of  democracy. This means 
bringing cultural recognition issues into the 
institutional process, which in turn means recognizing 
historical forms of self-government and especially 
interculturality in all areas of public life and creating 
institutional mechanisms (indigenous or subnational 
regional assemblies, etc.) with specific rights within 
the institutional structure of the State. It also means 
accepting public representation and deliberation 
as a form of self-organization that promotes new 
channels of participation both for particular issues 
and geographically for subnational regions. It 
seems essential to connect social and multicultural 
participation with local governments and those of 
subnational regions in order to strengthen civil society 
in these spheres and enhance territorial autonomy, 
while maintaining the principle of subsidiarity and the 
unity of the State. This involves the use of electronic 
communication as a tool for open access to public 
information, as a means of consultation, interaction 
and debate, and to ensure equality of opportunities. 
To this end, it will be necessary to expand the use 
of electronic communications in the community and 
make more equipment and public funding available 
to facilitate democratic participation by citizens. 
Innovative ways will also have to be found to provide 
public financing to civil society institutions in order 
to strengthen civic participation and activity. Of 
fundamental importance here is for civil society and 
the State to work in coordination for the common 
good. However, civil society is not to be confused 
with a political party or a programme of government: 
it cannot have a comprehensive strategy for social 
change. Any aspiration for a social or cultural actor 
or a political programme to monopolize the public 
space means denying that space to the diversity and 
freedom which is essential if  civil society itself  is to 
be able to expand. There is a need to strengthen the 
autonomy of individuals and civil society as the best 
defence against hegemony or absolutism of any kind. 
The challenge, then, is to include and try to combine 
the different actors, interests and orientations in new 
spaces of deliberation and participation that generate 
a new civic and political culture and promote options 
for democracy and development.
(iv) Increase the State’s power of action. In a 
renewed conception of  development, the market 
and the State can work alongside each other in 
the interests of  society and for the provision of 
public goods. This has been demonstrated recently 
by the new approaches and actors of  politics and 
development. The reorganization and renovation of 
the State must encompass at least three aspects:
— Participation in global markets is governed by 
the systemic competitiveness paradigm; what 
matters is not the competitiveness of one firm 
or another, but the country’s ability to organize 
and manage its affairs so that economic 
and non-economic factors are coordinated. 
Competitiveness entails a coordinating role for 
the State in the different processes of systemic 
competitiveness.
— The weight of the market and its disaggregating 
tendencies give the State a primordial role as 
a guarantor of social cohesion. Reformulation 
of the welfare State and development policies 
is a vital step towards viable development.
— The law-governed State encompasses autonomous 
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citizen action since what it is, ultimately, is a 
democratic State capable of speaking for and 
bringing together the citizen community. It is 
essential to increase the powers of  action of 
a legitimate State capable of  participating in 
globalization in the name of  society and in 
constant relation with it. The State’s capacity 
to create social cohesion will allow economic 
growth, distributive policies and development 
policies to be coordinated as the interests of 
the nation require in pursuit of greater social 
justice and poverty reduction. It is essential 
to regenerate State institutions, which in turn 
means strengthening a society independent of 
the State whose form must be determined by 
each country’s particular historical situation. 
In summary, it seems vital to enhance the 
capacity and legitimacy of the State so that it 
can take on and effectively perform the role of 
an agent of development and democracy. Over 
and above the technical assistance function, 
this State leadership can be manifested in the 
consistency given to the country’s programmes by 
a comprehensive intersectoral vision; the need for 
coordination through specific programme areas 
and institutional jurisdictions; the incorporation 
of  transparency mechanisms in management 
practices and accountability mechanisms for the 
public authorities and for private-sector actors 
and civil society organizations; and public-private 
coordination for development, with programme 
and project implementation and the adaptation 
of policies and instruments to different national 
situations and to the challenges raised by the 
centre-municipalities relationship.
(v) Associate advances in equity with the 
strengthening and renewal of  the institutions of 
democracy. There is a vital need for virtuous 
interaction between equity and institutions, on the 
basis of  common social values and goals. Equity 
means first and foremost the practical recognition 
of equality for all and the final eradication of the 
patronage and class-based discrimination which are 
so common in the political life of Latin America. It 
is important to promote a practical political culture 
associated with institutional mechanisms to punish 
discrimination based on ethnic origin or gender 
or directed at migrants or other minority groups. 
Equity means not just correcting unequal distribution 
but also considering the demands and attitudes of 
citizens, with a view to recognizing and altering 
situations of inequity to which a variety of social 
groups are subject. Thus, the structural problem of 
poverty and inequality in Latin America needs to 
be understood as a political problem and addressed 
by measures to encourage the poor and excluded to 
turn their needs into demands that are heard by the 
institutional system.
(vi) Strengthen the capabilities of today’s more 
autonomous and active citizens. It is very important 
to reinforce and legitimize the practice of an active 
and autonomous citizenship, with better informed 
citizens whose autonomy and freedom are more 
firmly rooted and who are better able to speak out 
and find a hearing. Political parties can no longer 
impose themselves without listening or govern 
without convincing, and they are increasingly 
having to respond to demands for truthfulness, 
transparency and civic respect. Given the emergence 
and consolidation of  a citizenry of  this nature 
and the development of  new spaces of  political 
deliberation, it is becoming essential to renew today’s 
systems of political representation and action.
(vii) Appreciate the importance of  the new 
media in the configuration of the public space. Latin 
American societies are increasingly interconnected. 
Citizens obtain information and take positions on 
matters of public interest by following the debates 
that take place in open forums, particularly the media 
and the new information technologies. Citizens listen 
and make themselves heard, furthermore, via public 
opinion and its connection with the media. While 
there are obvious tendencies towards private control 
of public communication, it seems vital for citizens 
to develop technological capabilities that allow 
them to engage in new forms of participation and 
communication through mobile phones, blogs, the 
Internet and other means. Modern information and 
communication technologies are powerful agents of 
a new kind of personal, participatory and interactive 
communication. Electronic communication can 
make it easier to debate, form opinions and spread 
ideas. It would be helpful to formulate policy 
proposals that opened up new forms of  civic 
participation and citizen oversight of the actions of 
public institutions and that were submitted to public 
debate through these communication systems that 
are increasingly penetrating people’s daily lives. The 
future of  democratic governance is bound up with 
the transformation of  traditional public spheres 
into interactive communication systems. It is hard 
to combat the politics of  scandal or conspiracy by 
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placing restraints on the media: what is needed is 
to foster debate and reduce corruption. To attain 
these goals it is essential to improve media access 
to sources of  information on corrupt practices 
and thereby discourage these, to give statutory 
protection to journalists, and to find ways of 
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